Civic Space Support Guide

[Global Directory – Human Rights] The Protection Ecosystem Map, powered by Open Briefing, maps out over 180 different emergency funding, solidarity, and protection mechanisms available to human rights defenders and civic actors. The database is filterable by thematic area, regional focus, and type of support.

[Global Directory – Protest Support] The Vuka! Coalition for Civic Action Protestor Support Phonebook is a support directory for protestors. Through the phonebook, protesters, journalists covering protests, and their allies can find various types of support from over 30 international and regional civil society organizations to protect themselves and elevate the impact of their protests.

[Helpline – Digital Threats] The CiviCERT network is a coordinating centre for technical civil society organisations supporting human and digital rights. The network coordinates rapid responses to digital security incidents, refers cases to each other when necessary, shares information about emerging threats, provides specialized support, and documents cases of digital threats.

[Helpline – Digital Threats] Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline is a free resource for global civil society that offers real time, direct technical assistance and advice. The Helpline is available 24/7 in nine languages and responds to all requests within two hours. It will help organizations assess risks, prioritize digital security, and resolve existing problems.

The following resources include emergency support and relocation services.

[All CSOs] The Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund provides emergency financial assistance to civil society organizations under threat or attack, as well as rapid response advocacy and resilience grants to support CSOs in responding to broader threats against civic space.

[All Human Rights CSOs] The EU Human Rights Defender Mechanism, which is called the Protect Defenders program, is a consortium of 23 NGOs active in the field of human rights. It manages a protection officer hotline available 24/7, delivers grants for urgent protection measures, supports the creation of shelters for human rights defenders at risk, and operates a program for temporary relocation both inside a country and abroad.

[CSO Facing Free Assembly and Association Threats] The Civicus Crisis Response Fundprovides urgent funding to civil society actors who are facing crises in freedom of assembly and association. The fund helps civil society conduct advocacy activities or respond proactively to threats to civic freedoms through resilience activities.

[CSOs Facing Digital Threats] Digital Defenders Parnership’s Incident Response Fund is a rapid-response mechanism for human rights defenders, journalists, activists, and organizations facing digital threats and attacks. It can be used to cover costs, which will directly reduce the risk or impact of a digital attack.

[LGBTQIA+ CSOs] Freedom House operates the Dignity for All LGBTI Assistance Program, a consortium of six leading human rights and LGBTQIA+ organizations that provides emergency assistance, advocacy funding, and security support to human rights defenders and civil society organizations under threat or attack due to their work for LGBTQIA+ rights.

[Global – Non-Profit Laws] The Global Nonprofits Guide is a free online guide that provides information on navigating non-profit laws around the world in over 55 countries. The user-friendly interface enables organizations to easily compare legislation in different jurisdictions and supports in identifying suitable countries for registration.

[Global – Threat Forecasting and Response] The INSPIRES Program produces learning on civic space by forecasting trends with machine learning. The program aims to understand civic space drivers and priorities, test interventions to boost civil society resilience to closing space threats, and empower local partners to address civic space shifts through flexible response support.

[Global – Large Funders] The Transparency & Accountability Initiative’s Civic Space Compendium collates resources, tools, and strategies that can be used by large funders and the grantees of large funders to mitigate the challenges of civic engagement restrictions.

[Europe – Banking] The Nonprofit Banking Guide from ECNL and PILnet provides guidance for civil society organizations on bank practices in European countries. The guide helps CSOs easily compare the conditions of how non-profits can open and manage an organizational bank account in different countries. The tool currently covers 38 countries.

This policy applies in exceptional circumstances only, when an OGP participating country appears to be taking actions that undermine the values and principles of OGP in a way that demonstrates an egregious and blatant disregard for those values and has the potential to be sufficiently damaging to OGP reputation.

This is a framework for OGP to respond swiftly to situations where there are allegations of serious violations of OGP values and principles by an OGP member. The protocol applies when a response required is urgent in nature, meaning that the concern cannot or will not be addressed in the near term (within three months) by the IRM, Procedural Review, or the Response Policy.

Recommended actions:

• Conduct internal risk assessments
• Diversify funding
• Run public awareness campaigns
• Participate in “know-your-rights” training
• Monitor and report civic space violations

The most critical period for the protection of civic space is before the passage of legislation that endangers it. Both internal and external preparation is essential before civic space becomes restricted.

The Lifeline Toolkit for CSOs in Restricted Space recommends holistic internal risk assessments, which build resilience to potential attacks and prepare individuals for dangerous or complex situations. These assessments cover vulnerabilities for individuals and organizations such as sources of funding, data privacy, and procedural guidance for “what if” scenarios. They should also include an assessment of how restricted civic space currently is and the implications of that on strategic action.

CSOs should understand that restrictions most often occur when civil society groups speak out against a specific policy or during politically sensitive periods like elections,and should include these types of situations in their risk assessment and scenario planning exercises.

Diversifying key funding sources may also help future-proof an organization, if NGOs with significant funding from international organizations are restricted (in the example of the Russian, Nicaraguan, or Georgian Foreign Agent laws). International donors are often aware of the challenges facing their grantees in situations like the above and may have alternatives, such as a community philanthropy base, which can be accessed when diversifying funding.

As civic space begins to be threatened, ICNL recommends that civil society conducts public awareness-raising campaigns about dangerous policy changes. These include creative ideas such as leaflets, distribution of stickers and posters, street theater, demonstrations, and social media campaigns.

“Know-Your-Rights” trainings are also recommended for civil society organizations, journalists, and human rights defenders. These equip participants with the skills to navigate changing regulatory frameworks and plan around and mitigate risks. A wide range of these trainings exist led by regional and international organizations, targeting a variety of practitioners and groups (such as immigrants, journalists, and human rights workers).

As civic space closes, it is essential that CSOs monitor changes and report them both domestically and internationally. This involves research, investigation, documentation, analysis and reporting to ensure that responses by the international community are based on facts. The CIVICUS Monitor is a leading tracker of civic space restrictions and provides a fact-based outlet for raising awareness on an international level. ICNL operates the Civic Freedom Monitor, which provides analysis on legal issues affecting civic freedoms in more than 50 countries. Regional monitors like the CSO Meter, which monitors the civil society environment in Eastern European countries, may report violations in more detail.

Alliance building, which is covered in detail in the section below, also begins during the preparing and preventing phase. Building relationships with the media, experienced lawyers, and allies within government who might sound an alarm if the government targets a specific individual, as well as with other CSOs, is essential to preparing for any shift in civic space.

Recommended actions:

• Build relationships with CSOs, funders, formal and informal government contacts, lawyers, public service provision groups, and international thematic coalitions

Where civil society groups form alliances, they are more likely to achieve success. This is due to their broadened resource pool and audience, a reduction in redundancies, strength in numbers, and increased legitimacy amongst domestic peers. Larger alliances often are able to better articulate a common message as a unified front to different audiences, which increases public awareness. These groups ensure the cause remains supported over longer periods of time through any flux in individual organizations.

Alliance building involves connecting with non-CSO groups as well. These groups include non-political service delivery groups that may not be obvious partners, but they can support a pivot to indirect action if needed (see “Indirect Action” below) and can be under less scrutiny than human rights-focused groups. Building informal and formal relationships with key government departments and agencies, or even with sympathetic individuals within institutions, can help CSOs understand how political dynamics are shifting and where pressure points for influencing decision-making may lie.

Connecting with international networks should be carefully weighed in contexts where these ties are under threat of vilification, especially if domestic CSOs receive funds from abroad. However, these connections can trigger rapid diplomatic responses through embassies, multilateral organizations, Special Rapporteurs, and other relevant stakeholders. Mobilizing a network of international actors thus can be an effective influence without exposing CSOs to further risks at home.

Civil society coalitions provide mutual support in navigating restrictions and reducing vulnerability to legal, physical, and digital threats in closing environments.

Recommended actions:

• Get involved at the local level of politics
• Participate in charitable giving or actions
• Protest through artistic expression
• Participate in service delivery
• Carry out “naming and faming” campaigns

In situations where the typical advocacy mission of civil society organizations is under threat, actions that are indirect may protect the safety and stability of the group. Work likecharity provision, artistic expression, and local-level political involvementcan be seen as less threatening to a regime, and retain the space for community involvement, learning, and organization.

For example, grassroots CSOs whose goal is to provide information and services to the community—for example, groups that share information on sexual health or domestic violence or organized local action such as park clean-ups and wheelchair ramp construction—faced fewer restrictions in early-2000’s Russia. These types of actions appealed to the idea that the state can provide for its own people.

Service delivery and contracting may also be actions that are non-threatening by a restrictive regime, and can provide an opportunity for CSOs to maintain an influence on policy. However, this opportunity is often provided firstly to groups that already support the state, and therefore may be difficult to attempt for organizations that are not specifically invited to do so. Service delivery can also create a difficult balance to maintain between the need to remain autonomous from government, maintaining the advocacy function of civil society, and reliably delivering services.

“Naming and faming” is an alternative to the confrontational “naming and shaming.” This approach “catches” people doing the right thing and supports them publicly. This generates a broader discourse on the need for public officials with integrity and incentivizes ethical conduct, without attracting scrutiny by naming those who do not live up to those values.

Even as civil society engages in indirect action in closed environments, there may still be scope for public advocacy and engagement aimed at promoting human rights and democratic values. As described in the first recommendation above, this kind of action is likely to be able to reach an international audience and increase pressure on a regime. Individual organizations and civil society collectively will have to consider how best to balance and combine these approaches.

Recommended actions:

• Assess organizational digital safety and data security
• Conduct digital safety training sessions for staff
• Consider using encrypted messaging services

While the internet and digital technologies have proven useful in raising awareness of social issues and growing unrest in cases such as the Arab Spring, Hong Kong’s 2019 pro-democracy protests, and social movements like Black Lives Matter, it can quickly become a double-edged sword. Entire movements or organizations may function well in remote environments, but the need for online communication and data storage creates entry points for groups with bad intentions to access sensitive material.

According to Microsoft, in 2023, NGOs and think tanks were the second highest targets of state-sponsored cyber criminals, and non-profit organizations were targeted more than any other industry when comparing malicious traffic to their websites as a proportion of total traffic. Between July 2022 and June 2023, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity found that individuals within civil society were the second most-targeted sector globally by state-sponsored actors. Government-driven internet shutdowns are also becoming more common, with 283 documented across 39 countries in 2023, the highest number of incidents since monitoring began in 2016. As digital danger grows for civil society, using technology in a secure manner becomes more essential.

There are many guidelines for how to stay safe online, including the Mitigating Cyber Threats with Limited Resources, Guidance for Civil Societyreport published in 2024 by the United States security offices, in collaboration with partners from Canada, Estonia, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The NGO Front Line Defenders publishes a variety of guides with necessary steps to protect an internet connection, files, communications, passwords, phones, and computers. TheDigital Security Lab Ukraine also published atoolkit specifically focused on responsible use of AI for civil society.

Beyond written resources, Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline and Amnesty International’s Security Lab provide hands-on support to human rights defenders and civil society who believe they are the subject of a targeted attack. Open Briefing provides training on internet security for non-profits and foundations while the Engine Room provides support for civil society through consultation and research to use technology and data in safe, responsible, and strategic ways, while actively mitigating the vulnerabilities created by digital systems.

Once cybersecurity risks have been properly managed however, the internet can be a valuable tool in allowing loosely coordinated publics to demand change, without the physical risk that protesting can pose. What used to occur only through formal organizations can now occur through more informal, impromptu groups—and formally organized CSOs can join, lead, or otherwise support these types of actions.

Digital communications—over email, social media, or encrypted channels on apps such as Signal—can raise awareness and coordinate activist logistics in seconds. Documents and organizational history can be maintained digitally in encrypted cloud-based storage. Blockchain technology is increasingly being used for secure fundraising, force-publishing speech initially removed by censors, and storing data in a decentralized manner. Specific ideas for how different emerging technologies can be leveraged to broaden civic space are presented in the Civicspace.tech resource supported by ICNL and USAID. The resource covers tools from social media and generative AI to satellite systems and automation, and emphasizes the security risks associated with each activity.