Digital Governance

Governments need to establish the legal foundation for freedom of opinion and expression. In addition, governments must protect journalists, media workers, and researchers. This includes monitoring, investigating, and acting on threats and attacks against them. Actions may include the establishment or encouragement of independent press councils, which include transparently selected professional journalists who provide ethical standards and self-regulation for media workers. For a more complete set of recommendations, see the Open Gov Guide chapter on “Free Expression and Media Freedom.”

Governments may establish or apply processes to limit market concentration, such as requiring open competition for broadcast permits, taking pro-competition actions, or establishing ownership transparency requirements.Governments can alsomandatethe public disclosure of beneficial ownership and financing arrangements for all large media outlets as a necessary step to build trust and protect against capture and market concentration.

In some cases, especially in the case of local media, governments may provide subsidies or tax preferences to investigative journalists and media outlets, especially those carrying out fact-based reporting and counter-disinformation operations. Such support should be made through independent, public, and rule-based processes to avoid political bias.

Governments should avoid restricting speech. Where restrictions are absolutely necessary, they should be consistent with transparent, objective criteria subject to periodic public review and dispute resolution.

Governments will need to understand the impacts of policies related to new technology, such as algorithmic transparency (including around training data), the watermarking of AI-generated content, and the use of impact assessment and mitigation to identify and address discriminatory practices and outcomes.

Depending on the context,governments may require the public disclosure of media outlets owned by non-domestic actors. Such schemes can help illuminate covert and potentially malign communication activities.

Such disclosures should include transparency reports, which include responses to government takedown orders. These may cover human rights impacts and privacy, as appropriate. They may also include the publication of steps to follow when conducting content moderation and algorithmic decision-making. Ideally, where appropriate, such information should be published in standardized formats that allow for discovery and comparison.

Governments may convene platforms to ensure that they take steps to limit amplifying disinformation and misinformation. Such coordination should be public, based on the law, and consistent with human rights standards.

Legislation such as the EU’s Digital Services Act provides access to data and channels for reporting for academics and other researchers. The most ambitious reforms may include the sharing of anonymized or synthetic data to investigate patterns of illegal activity and will provide feedback on the disposition of complaints from the public. In addition, trusted flagging processes should have clear criteria for evidence and ethics of researchers.

Women in politics are especially vulnerable to disinformation campaigns.Special measures should be taken to protect women in politics from gendered attacks and tech-facilitated gender-based violence. Governments can engage organizations representing women and other minorities in crafting solutions to harassment and violence.

Curricula for all age cohorts can be disseminated to help students and adult learners apply critical thinking and media literacy. Recent examples from São Paolo (Brazil) and Finland illustrate how such educational programs could be implemented.

Building on efforts to anticipate and respond to public information requests, governments can use watermarking, blockchain technologies, or authentication portals in existing systems to ensure the public that official documents have not been modified.

Partner with non-governmental experts to report on issues related to information integrity to identify key points of vulnerability. Take extra precaution to ensure that such efforts are seen as transpartisan and rule-based. These efforts may have a particular focus on the role that foreign actors play in spreading disinformation.

Establish threat monitoring and response mechanisms to respond to disinformation with fact-based, trusted sources during election times. This is especially important for those communities that may be targeted by disinformation aiming to dissuade political participation.

• Governments can prioritize getting accurate information to vulnerable communities through communication channels that they use most.

Design and implement effective participatory mechanisms with members of the public, journalists, social media platforms, academics, and civil society organizations to prioritize information integrity interventions. Ensure a clear public mandate and non-partisan criteria for membership selection.

A well-coordinated multi-agency approach can help establish sectoral priorities, enable prompt information-sharing, and avoid the duplication of efforts between institutional authorities. Task forces may focus on technical dimensions of disinformation, such as hybrid threats, foreign interference, and electoral interference. To counter potential backlash, ensure that the mandate is clear and that relationships between agencies are defined in advance.

Establishmulti-level learning groups with local officials and locally focused organizations that deal with disinformation at that level. These groups would provide a space to share good practices and identify trends in threats to information integrity.

Establish independent, depoliticized bodies to ensure that the public has access to timely, expert information and is aware of threats during times of crisis.

• This may include pre-bunking, especially in anticipation of key threats. Pre-bunking can be more effective than fact-checking after misinformation or disinformation circulates. When authorities ensure that correct information is publicly available, especially to journalists, it can help the media carry out pre-bunking efforts.

Ensure that communications from administrative offices meet certain standards of accuracy and completeness, and do not meet the description of campaigning. This should include guidelines for communications shared on social media platforms.

This should include sharing digital security practices to protect government and candidate data.See the Open Gov Guide chapter on “Open Election Data” for additional extensive details.

This includes ring-fencing budgets and staffing to ensure independence and making reviews periodic, rather than ongoing.

The creation of a specific ombudsman or inspectorate body can provide a critical oversight function that is separate from a regulatory body by receiving or investigating complaints of malfeasance related to disinformation. These bodies can also, if mandated, identify system-wide issues that may encourage the spread of domestic or foreign disinformation in a country.

• For example, in the case of state-run media, the Voice of America organization has an Inspector General that serves this oversight function.

National legislators can ensure there is a legal avenue for CSOs and other non-government actors to hold government officials to account through the judicial system when the government itself is responsible for promoting illegal disinformation.

Implement a collective code of conduct for online campaigning. This could include the responsible use of big data, a pledge not to engage in hate speech or gendered attacks, and the treatment of deep fakes and leaked information.

This may include fully expanding transparency for political campaigning and finance into the online realm to cover new funding, spending, and campaigning tactics. This includes ensuring that public declarations cover in-kind donations of digital support, including reporting non-contestant spending.

Anonymous advertisers may mask malign foreign influence in elections. Encourage platforms to apply existing identity validation systems for online advertisers to all issues and political advertisers. Such a “know-your-political-customer” system can contribute to and complement existing, yet often insufficient, disclosure arrangements. For more information about online political advertising, see the Open Gov Guide chapter on “Political Finance.”

Modern campaigns are multi-channel and multi-platform. Only a unified repository can create a comprehensive picture to inform critical debate about political campaigns and their messaging.

Governments should avoid content bans generally, but where necessary for matters of national interest, these should be based on the law, proportional to the threat, and transparently justified.

Parliaments may initiate an independent human rights assessment where existing or new laws aim to govern information integrity. Such reviews can evaluate the potential impacts on the public’s ability to participate.

Ensure that ombudsman’s offices or inspectorates can field complaints from members of the public on infringements of civil liberties by the government and, where necessary, request information from agencies and send that information onward for judicial review.

Legislators can pass or strengthen protections for citizens, organizations, civil servants, private sector actors, and media that face retaliation. Specific measures include:

• limiting defamation and libel lawsuits
• limiting strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPP)
• limiting retaliation against whistleblowers and providing incentives for exposing waste, fraud, and abuse
• carrying out oversight to defend human rights advocates

Legislators can pass laws to limit the government’s ability to abuse defamation and libel laws, which can be used to suppress criticism of the government under the guise of stamping out “fake news.” Legislators can also provide an avenue for citizens to seek legal remedies when governments apply disinformation measures to forward harmful interests.