Skeptic’s Guide (2022) – Notes
Notes
Introduction
Access to Justice
Fiscal Openness
Open Contracting
Social Audits
Grievance Redress Mechanisms
Civic Space
Debt Transparency
Algorithmic Transparency
Parliamentary Transparency
Beyond Policies
[1] These reviews of evidence were developed in collaboration with OGP partner organizations: Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies; Accountability Research Center at American University; Open Contracting Partnership; International Budget Partnership; Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency; and Hertie School of Governance.
[2] This chapter is based on a background paper Mark Weston developed to support The Skeptic’s Guide: Mark Weston, The Benefits of Access to Justice for Economies, Societies and the Social Contract: A Literature Review (Open Government Partnership and Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies, May 2022), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/the-benefits-of-access-to-justice-for-economies-societies-and-the-social-contract-a-literature-review/
[3] Task Force on Justice, Justice for All – Final Report (Center on International Cooperation, 2019), https://www.justice.sdg16.plus/report.
[4] Governments of Afghanistan et al., Joint Letter to the UN Secretary-General Reimagining social contracts: A call to put people at the center of justice, 14 Apr. 2021, https://www.justice.sdg16.plus/ministerial.
[5] Reza Lahidji et al., Building a business case for access to justice (OECD, 2020), https://www.oecd.org/gov/building-a-business-case-for-access-to-justice.pdf
[6] Zhigang Wei, Hugh M. McDonald, and Christine Coumarelos, “Fines: Are disadvantaged people at a disadvantage?” Justice Issues 27 (Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, Feb. 2018), http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/site/articleIDs/D5D375991CE8E1B68525823A000641F4/$file/JI_27_Fines_disadvantaged_people.pdf.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Martin Gramatikov et al., Justice Needs and Satisfaction in the United States 2021 (HiiL, 2021), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/justice-needs-and-satisfaction-us.pdf.
[9] Ibid.
[10] World Justice Project, “Women’s Access to Justice: A Global Snapshot” (8 Mar. 2019), https://worldjusticeproject.org/news/womens-access-justice-global-snapshot.
[11] World Bank Group, Women, Business and the Law 2018 (2018), 17, http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29498.
[12] Weston, The Benefits of Access to Justice citing Sultan Mehmood, “Judicial Independence and Development: Evidence from Pakistan” AMSE Working Papers 2041 (Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Dec. 2020), https://ideas.repec.org/p/aim/wpaimx/2041.html.
[13] For this case, disadvantaged groups are those outlined in the previous mention of this study in Australia on the Equality subsection.
[14] Weston The Benefits of Access to Justice citing Wei, McDonald, and Coumarelos, “Fines: Are disadvantaged people at a disadvantage?”
[15] Andrew Burridge and Nick Gill, “Conveyor-Belt Justice: Precarity, Access to Justice, and Uneven Geographies of Legal Aid in UK Asylum Appeals” Antipode 29, no. 1 (Wiley Online Library, 3 Aug. 2016): 23–42, https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12258.
[16] Weston, The Benefits of Access to Justice citing Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer, and Jana Whalley, “Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention” Cal. L. Rev. 106, no. 3 (Jun. 2018): 785, https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38WH2DF26.
[17] Weston, The Benefits of Access to Justice citing Camilo Gutiérrez Patiño et al., Global Insights on Access to Justice (World Justice Project, 2019), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-A2J-2019.pdf.
[18] Legal costs are around USD 6,000 for land and family issues, over USD 3,000 for problems with the police, and at least USD 1,750 for problems related to immigration, money, domestic violence, abuse, housing, personal injury, or property damage. This was taken from a representative sample. Martin Gramatikov et al., Justice Needs and Satisfaction in the United States 2021 (HiiL, 2021), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/justice-needs-and-satisfaction-us.pdf.
[19] Rodrigo Núñez et al., Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Uganda 2020 (HiiL, Sep. 2020), https://www.hiil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/JNS_Uganda_2020_online-1.pdf.
[20] J.J. Prescott and Sonja B. Starr, “Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical Study” Harv. L. Rev. 133, no. 8 (May 2020): 2460–555, https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2165/.
[21] Sophie Stewart, Discussion Paper: The Case for Smart Justice Alternatives: Responding to justice issues in WA through a Justice Reinvestment approach (Social Reinvestment WA, 30 Mar. 2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59c61e6dbebafb0293c04a54/t/5ef5632af22174273c5d18d5/1593140018902/SRWA+Discussion+Paper+on+Justice+Reinvestment+in+WA+March2020+%281%29.pdf.
[22] Romain Espinosa, Claudine Desrieux, and Marc Ferracci, “Labor market and access to justice” Internat’l Rev. of L. and Econ 54 (Jun. 2018): 1–16, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014481881730042X.
[23] Task Force on Justice, Justice for All – Final Report (Center on International Cooperation, 2019), https://www.justice.sdg16.plus/_files/ugd/90b3d6_746fc8e4f9404abeb994928d3fe85c9e.pdf.
[24] Arnaud Deseau, Adam Levai, and Michèle Schmiegelo, “Access to Justice and Economic Development: Evidence from an International Panel Dataset” LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2019009 (Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales de l’Université Catholique de Louvain, Apr. 2019), https://ideas.repec.org/p/ctl/louvir/2019009.html.
[25] Weston, The Benefits of Access citing Johannes Boehm and Ezra Oberfield “Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the Organization of Production” Working Paper 24937 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Aug. 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24937.
[26] Weston, The Benefits of Access citing Adam Aberra and Matthieu, “Does legal representation increase investment? Evidence from a field experiment in Kenya” J. of Dev’t Econ 150C (Elsevier, 2021), https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v150y2021ics0304387820301875.html.
[27] Weston, The Benefits of Access citing United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict (World Bank, 2018), http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28337; Task Force on Justice, Justice for All.
[28] Mathilde Laisne, Jon Wool, and Christian Hencrichsonne, Past Due: Examining the Costs and Consequences of Charging for Justice in New Orleans (Vera Institute of Justice, 2017), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/past-due-costs-consequences-charging-for-justice-new-orleans.pdf.
[29] J.J. Prescott, “Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform Technology” Vand. L. Rev. 70 (2017): 1993–2050, https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2912&context=articles.
[30] Weston, The Benefits of Access citing Prescott, “Improving Access to Justice.”
[31] The Resource for Great Programs, Return-on-Investment Analysis for Pro Bono Ontario, Final Project Report (Pro Bono Ontario, 18 Sep. 2017), https://www.probonoontario.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ROI.pdf.
[32] Weston, The Benefits of Access citing Stout Risius Ross, Inc., Economic Return on Investment of Providing Counsel in Philadelphia Eviction Cases for Low-Income Tenants (Philadelphia Bar Ass’n, 2018), http://philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBA.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/PhiladelphiaEvictionsReport.pdf.
[33] Weston, The Benefits of Access citing Sofie Marien and Hannah Werner, “Fair treatment, fair play? The relationship between fair treatment perceptions, political trust and compliant and cooperative attitudes cross-nationally” Eur. J. of Pol’ Res. 58, no. 1 (Feb. 2019): 72–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12271.
[34] Weston, The Benefits of Access citing Kyle Peyton, Michael Siera-Arévalo, and David G. Rand, “A field experiment on community policing and police legitimacy” Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 116, no. 40 (2019): 19894–19898, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1910157116.
[35] Weston, The Benefits of Access citing Naci H. Mocan, Samantha Bielen, and Wim Marneffe, “Quality of Judicial Institutions, Crimes, Misdemeanors, and Dishonesty” Working Paper 24396 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24396/w24396.pdf.
[36] Verónica Michel, “Institutional Design, Prosecutorial Independence, and Accountability: Lessons from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)” Laws 10, no. 58 (2021): 58, https://doi.org/10.3390/laws10030058.
[37] Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “Fact Sheet: the CICIG’s Legacy in Fighting Corruption in Guatemala” (27 Aug. 2019), https://www.wola.org/analysis/cicigs-legacy-fighting-corruption-guatemala/.
[38] Guillermo Trejo and Camilo Nieto-Matiz, Containing Large-Scale Criminal Violence through Internationalized Prosecution: How the CICIG Contributed to the Reduction of Guatemala’s Murder Rate (2019), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335711550_Containing_Large-Scale_Criminal_Violence_through_Internationalized_Prosecution_How_the_CICIG_Contributed_to_the_Reduction_of_Guatemala’s_Murder_Rate.
[39] In a survey of a nationally representative sample of 1,546 Guatemalans in 2017, 71% said they trusted CICIG, while only 43% trusted the Constitutional Court and 54% trusted the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Dinorah Azpuru D, “What Does the Public Report on Corruption, the CICIG, the Public Ministry, and the Constitutional Court in Guatemala?” Latin American Public Opinion Project Topical Brief 29 (Vanderbilt Univ., 31 Aug. 2017): 1–5, https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/ITB029en.pdf.
[40] Guadalupe Kavanaugh, Maria Micaela Sviatschi, and Iva Trako, “Women Officers, Gender Violence and Human Capital: Evidence from Women’s Justice Centers in Peru” halshs-01828539f (HAL, 2018), https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01828539/document.
[41] Weston, The Benefits of Access.
[42] This chapter is based on a background paper commissioned to support the development of The Skeptic’s Guide: Martin Haus, Joachim Wehner, and Paolo de Renzio, (When) Do Open Budgets Transform Lives? Progress and Next Steps in Fiscal Openness Research (International Budget Partnership, Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency and Open Government Partnership, May 2022), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/when-do-open-budgets-transform-lives-progress-and-next-steps-in-fiscal-openness-research/.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] People Powered, “Participatory Budgeting”, https://www.peoplepowered.org/about-pb.
[46] For a definition of each stage of the budget cycle, please refer to the International Budget Partnership’s website: https://internationalbudget.org/2017/02/making-budget-cycle-budget-formulation-stage/.
[47] Robert M. Gonzalez, Matthew Harvey, and Foteini Tzachrista, Monitoring Corruption: Can Top-down Monitoring Crowd-Out Grassroots Participation? (SSRN, 18 Jun. 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3633248.
[48] Top-down audits are those performed by high-level government institutions
[49] Haus, Wehner, and Renzio, (When) Do Open Budgets Transform Lives?
[50] Gonzalez, Harvey, and Tzachrista, Monitoring Corruption.
[51] Yves Zamboni and Stephan Litschig, “Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil” J. of Dev’t Econ. 134 (2018): 133–149, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.03.008.
[52] Michael Touchton, Brian Wampler, and Tiago Peixoto, “Of democratic governance and revenue: Participatory institutions and tax generation in Brazil” Governance 34, no. 4 (Oct. 2021): 1193–1212, https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12552.
[53] Fredrik M. Sjoberg, et al., “Voice and punishment: A global survey experiment on tax morale” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8855 (World Bank, 2019), https://rendircuentas.mideplan.go.cr/.
[54] Michael Touchton and Brian Wampler, “Public engagement for public health: participatory budgeting, targeted social programmes, and infant mortality in Brazil” Dev’t in Practice 30, no. 5 (2020): 681–686, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2020.1742662.
[55] Haus, Wehner, and Renzio, (When) Do Open Budgets Transform Lives?
[56] Jonathan L. Weigel, “The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax Them” The Quarterly J. of Econ. 135, no. 4 (2020): 1849–1903, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa019.
[57] Touchton and Wampler, “Public engagement for public health.”
[58] Available at: http://mapainversionescr.mideplan.go.cr/.
[59] Martín A. Rossi, Antonia Vazquez, and Juan Cruz Vieyra, Information Disclosure and the Performance of Public Investment, the Case of Costa Rica Discussion Paper No. IDB-DP-795 (Inter-American Development Bank, Aug. 2020), https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Information-Disclosure-and-the-Performance-of-Public-Investment-The-Case-of-Costa-Rica.pdf.
[60] Silvia Vannutelli, “From lapdogs to watchdogs: Random auditor assignment and municipal fiscal performance in Italy” (unpublished manuscript, 11 Nov. 2021), https://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/from_lapdogs_to_watchdogs.pdf.
[61] Sounmon Hong and B. Shine Cho, “Citizen participation and the redistribution of public goods” Public Administration 96, no. 3 (Sep. 2018): 481–496, https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12521.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Touchton and Wampler, “Public engagement for public health.”
[64] Haus, Wehner, and Renzio, (When) Do Open Budgets Transform Lives?
[65] Philipp Krause and Gonzalo Hernández Licona “From experimental findings to evidence-based policy” World Development 127 (2020): 1–3, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104812.
[66] Ritva Reinikka and Jacob Svensson, “Fighting corruption to improve schooling: Evidence from a newspaper campaign in Uganda” J. of the Eur. Econ.Ass’n 3, no. 2–3 (2005): 259–267, https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.259; Ritva Reinikka and Jacob Svensson, “The power of information in public services: Evidence from education in Uganda” J. of Pub. Econ. 95, no. 7–8 (2011): 956–966, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.006.
[67] Gustavo J. Bobonis, Luis R. Cámara Fuertes, and Rainer Schwabe, “Monitoring corruptible politicians” Amer. Econ. Rev. 106, no. 8 (Aug. 2016): 2371–2405, http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130874.
[68] Bobonis, Fuertes, and Schwabe, “Monitoring corruptible politicians.”
[69] Maria Paula Gerardino, Stephan Litschig, and Dina Pomeranz, “Distortion by Audit: Evidence from Public Procurement” NBER Working Paper 23978 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Aug. 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23978.
[70] This chapter is based on an evidence review conducted by Andrew McDevitt to support The Skeptic’s Guide. Andrew McDevitt, “State of Evidence: Open Contracting” (Open Government Partnership and Open Contracting Partnership, May 2022), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/state-of-the-evidence-open-contracting/.
[71] Open Contracting Partnership and Value for Women, Towards Gender Balance in Public Procurement, Understanding the Barriers and Solutions to Include Women-Led Businesses (Open Contracting Partnership, 2020), https://www.open-contracting.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OCP2020-Gender-Responsive-Procurement.pdf.
[72] Artur Kovalchuk, Charles Kenny, and Mallika Snyder, Examining the Impact of E-Procurement in Ukraine (Working Paper 511, Jun. 2019), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-impact-e-procurement-ukraine.pdf.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Sophie Brown, “‘Everyone sees everything’ Overhauling Ukraine’s corrupt contracting sector” (Open Contracting Partnership, 28 Nov. 2016), https://medium.com/open-contracting-stories/everyone-sees-everything-fa6df0d00335.
[75] Official Prozorro BI dashboard, https://bi.prozorro.org/sense/app/fba3f2f2-cf55-40a0-a79f-b74f5ce947c2/sheet/HbXjQep/state/analysis.
[76] Roberto de Michele and Gastón Pierri, Transparency and Digital Government, the Impact of COMPR.AR in Argentina Discussion Paper Nº IDB-DP-767 (Inter-American Development Bank, May 2020), https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Transparency-and-Digital-Government-The-Impact-of-COMPR.AR-in-Argentina.pdf.
[77] Sophie Brown and Georg Neumann, “Paraguay’s transparency alchemists: How citizens are using open contracting to improve public spending” (Open Contracting Partnership, 2 Oct. 2017), https://medium.com/open-contracting-stories/paraguays-transparency-alchemists-623c8e3c538f.
[78] OECD, The Korean Public Procurement Service, Innovating for Effectiveness OECD Public Governance Reviews (OECD Publishing, 2016), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/the-korean-public-procurement-service_9789264249431-en#page4.
[79] Open Contracting, “Patients, experts, and openness: A powerful combination therapy for unaffordable medicines in Moldova” (Open Contracting Partnership, 23 Nov. 2021), https://www.open-contracting.org/2021/11/23/patients-experts-and-openness-a-powerful-combination-therapy-for-unaffordable-medicines-in-moldova/.
[80] Colombia Compra Eficiente, “Resultados del sistema de indcadores” [Results of the Indicator System] (2015), https://colombiacompra.gov.co/indicadores/resultados-del-sistema-de-indicadores.
[81] Dakshina G. de Silva et al., “The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions” Eur. Econ. Rev. 52, no. 1 (Jan. 2008), https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v52y2008i1p150-181.html.
[82] Hiroshi Ohashi, “Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works” Rev. of Indus. Org. 34 (17 Jun. 2009): 267–285, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11151-009-9208-1.
[83] Sylvain Chassang and Juan Ortner, Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement Princeton Univ. William S. Dietrich II Econ. Theory Cntr. Res. Paper No. 072_2015 (SSRN, 20 Oct. 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2683505.
[84] Details can include: eligible languages; selection method; criteria information; estimated duration of the contract; CPV codes; winner’s name; NUTS codes; subcontracting information; contract value; and use of EU funds.
[85] Given that single bidder contracts are on average 7.1% more expensive than contracts with multiple bidders, the associated annual price savings across Europe are substantial. Single bidder contracts are more likely to have been manipulated to favor a certain company and their price requests. See Sophie Brown and Nicholas Penagos, “A little data goes a long way: How bidder analysis could boost competition in Colombia’s infrastructure contracts” (Open Contracting Partnership, 3 May 2019), https://www.open-contracting.org/2019/05/03/a-little-data-goes-a-long-way-how-bidder-analysis-could-boost-competition-in-colombias-infrastructure-contracts/.
[86] Monika Bauhr et al., Lights on the Shadows of Public Procurement: Transparency in government contracting as an antidote to corruption? (Digiwhist, Aug. 2017), http://digiwhist.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/D3.2-Light-on-the-Shadows-of-Public-Procurement_corr.pdf.
[87] Stephen Knack, Nataliya Biletska, and Kanishka Kacker, Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets: Evidence from Firm Surveys in 88 Developing Countries Policy Research Working Paper 8078 (World Bank Group, May 2017), https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/817871496169519447/pdf/WPS8078.pdf.
[88] Charles Kenny and Ben Chrisman, Results Through Transparency: Does Publicity Lead to Better Procurement? Working Paper 437 (Center for Global Development, Sep. 2016), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/results-through-transparency-does-publicity-lead-better-procurement-working-paper-437.pdf.
[89] Coviello, D. and Mariniello, M. (2014) Publicity requirements in public procurement: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design. Journal of Public Economics, 109, 76–100. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272713002107
[90] Isabelle Adam, Alfredo Hernandez Sanchez, and Mihály Fazekas, Global Public Procurement Open Competition Index GTI-WP/2021:02 (Government Transparency Institute, 7 Apr. 2021), http://www.govtransparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Adam-et-al_Evidence-paper_procurement-competition_210902_formatted_2.pdf.
[91] Paul Lagunes, Guardians of accountability: A field experiment on corruption and inefficiency in local public works C-89335-PER-1 (International Growth Centre, Nov. 2017), https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Lagunes-2017-Working-paper.pdf
[92] Gabriel Šípoš, Samuel Spáč, and Martin Kollárik, Not in force until published online. What the radical transparency regime of public contracts achieved in Slovakia (Transparency International Slovakia, 2015), https://www.transparency.sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Open-Contracts.pdf.
[93] Rushda Majeed, Promoting Accountability, Monitoring Services: Textbook Procurement and Delivery, The Philippines, 2002-2005 (Princeton Univ., 2013), https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/promoting-accountability-monitoring-services-textbook-procurement-and-delivery.
[94] Transparency International Georgia, Simplified Procurement – Corruption Risks in Non-Competitive Government Contracts (Dec. 2013), https://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/Simplified%20procurement%20-%20Eng%20.pdf.
[95] Theo Van der Merwe, “Beneficial ownership registers: Progress to date” U4 Helpdesk Answer 6 (Chr. Michelsen Institute and Transparency Institute, 2020), https://www.u4.no/publications/beneficial-ownership-registers-progress-to-date.
[96] Bruno Baránek, Leo Musolff, and Vítězslav Titl, Data transparency, public oversight and collusion in e-procurement (EconPol Europe, 25 Oct. 2020), https://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2020-10/Working_Paper_Titl_Vitezslav_Collusion_in_auctions.pdf.
[97] OGP, Anti-Corruption Initiatives, Beneficial Ownership, Open Government Partnership Global Report (2019), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Global-Report_Beneficial-Ownership.pdf
[98] Sabrina Martin et al., Gender Equality and Social Inclusion in ICT Procurement: Discovery Report (Oxford Insights, Aug. 2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58b2e92c1e5b6c828058484e/t/5f887193b824754224847cfd/1602777495732/GESI+report+-+Discovery+Report.pdf.
[99] Niul Burton, Theresa Harrison, and Curtis L. Simpson “How can greater supplier diversity unclog your growth pipeline?” (Ernst & Young, 2015), https://businessdocbox.com/Business_Software/91218286-How-can-greater-supplier-diversity-unclog-your-growth-pipeline.html.
[100] Open Government Partnership, “Using Data on Women-Owned Businesses in Albania” (29 May 2019), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/lessons-from-reformers-using-data-on-women-owned-businesses-in-albania/.
[101] Dirección General Contrataciones Públicas, (homepage) (accessed Apr. 2022), https://www.dgcp.gob.do/.
[102] Romina Colman, “Women win one in four contracts in the Dominican Republic thanks to inclusive procurement reforms” (Open Contracting Partnership, 23 Sep. 2020), http://www.open-contracting.org/2020/09/23/women-win-one-in-four-contracts-in-the-dominican-republic-thanks-to-inclusive-procurement-reforms/.
[103] OECD, Government at a Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2020 (20 Mar. 2020), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-2020_13130fbb-en.
[104] Several countries (e.g., Mexico, Ghana, North Macedonia, and Afghanistan) have made commitments specifically to promote beneficial ownership transparency in public procurement processes. (See Justine Davila, Michael Barron, and Tim Law, Towards a Global Norm of Beneficial Ownership Transparency A scoping study on a strategic approach to achieving a global norm (Adam Smith International and UKAID, Mar. 2019), https://adamsmithinternational.com/app/uploads/2019/07/Towards-a-Global-Norm-of-Beneficial-Ownership-Transparency-Phase-2-Paper-March-2019.pdf and “North Macedonia Beneficial Ownership Transparency in Public Procurement (MK0144)” (Open Government Partnership, 2021), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/members/north-macedonia/commitments/MK0144/.) Meanwhile, Open Ownership is working to support countries (including Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa) to link up their beneficial ownership and procurement data. Open Ownership, “Publications” (accessed Apr. 2022), https://www.openownership.org/resources/?type=case-studies.
[105] Van der Merwe, “Beneficial ownership registers: Progress to date.”
[106] Mihály Fazekas and Jürgen René Blumzekas, Improving Public Procurement Outcomes Review of Tools and the State of the Evidence Base Policy Research Working Paper 9690 (World Bank Group, Jun. 2021), https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/656521623167062285/pdf/Improving-Public-Procurement-Outcomes-Review-of-Tools-and-the-State-of-the-Evidence-Base.pdf; Jan Telgen, Jonna van der Krift, and Astrid Wake, Public procurement reform: Assessing interventions aimed at improving transparency (Dept. for International Dev’t and UKAID, 2016), https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Public-Procurement-Reform.pdf.
[107] This chapter is based on an annotated bibliography put together by Suchi Pande to support The Skeptic’s Guide: Suchi Pande, “Social audits in service delivery: An annotated bibliography” (Open Government Partnership and Accountability Research Center, May 2022), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/social-audits-in-service-delivery-an-annotated-bibliography/.
[108] Pande, “Social audits in service delivery: An annotated bibliography.”
[109] The empirical evidence reviewed for this publication is drawn largely from South Asia, and East and West African countries. A regional imbalance in the included sources suggests the potential to inform future action-research agendas intended to strengthen the impact of social audits on service delivery.
[110] Martina Björkman and Jakob Svensson, “Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda” The Quarterly J. of Econ. 124, no. 2 (2009): 735–69, https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.735.
[111] Gagan Gurung et al., “The Role of Social Audit as a Social Accountability Mechanism for Strengthening Governance and Service Delivery in the Primary Health Care Setting of Nepal: A Qualitative Study” Critical Public Health 30, no. 5 (2020): 612–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/09581596.2019.1667487.
[112] Jessica Gordon, et al., APPI/SPREAD Collective Action for Nutrition Social Audit Programme Odisha, India: Final Evaluation Report (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2019), https://www.ifpri.org/publication/appispread-collective-action-nutrition-social-audit-programme-odisha-india-final.
[113] Pande, “Social audits in service delivery” citing Gordon et al., APPI/SPREAD Collective Action.
[114] Shehrin Shaila Mahmood et al., “Feasibility, Acceptability and Initial Outcome of Implementing Community Scorecard to Monitor Community Level Public Health Facilities: Experience from Rural Bangladesh” Int’l J. for Equity in Health 19, no. 1 (2020): 155, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-020-01265-6.
[115] Andrew Wilson, “Making local health services accountable: Social auditing in Nepal’s health sector” (Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für, Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, 2015).
[116] Darin Christensen et al., “Building Resilient Health Systems: Experimental Evidence from Sierra Leone and the 2014 Ebola Outbreak” The Quarterly J. of Econ. 136, no. 2 (2021): 1145–98, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa039.
[117] World Vision, Scaling Social Accountability: Evidence from Asia, Africa and the Caucasus (Citizen Voice and Action and World Vision International, 2019), https://www.wvi.org/social-accountability/publication/scaling-social-accountability-evidence-asia-africa-and-caucasus.
[118] Kiran Bhatty, Open Government in Education: Learning from Social Audits in IndiaCase Study for the IIEP-UNESCO Research Project ‘Open Government in Education: Learning from Experience’ (Centre for Policy Research, 2021), https://etico.iiep.unesco.org/en/open-government-education-learning-social-audits-india.
[119] This case is also featured in the Open Contracting section. Please refer to that section to learn more.
[120] Social Justice Coalition, Report of the Khayelitsha ‘Mshengu’ Toilet Social Audit. (International Budget Partnership, 10 May 2013), https://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Social-Justice-Coalition-Report-of-the-Khayelitsha-Mshengu-Toilet-Social-Audit.pdf.
[121] Britta Ricker, Jonathan Cinnamon, and Yonn Dierwechter, “When Open Data and Data Activism Meet: An Analysis of Civic Participation in Cape Town, South Africa” The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien 64, no. 3 (2020): 359–73, https://doi.org/10.1111/cag.12608.
[122] Gagan Gurung et al., “The Role of Social Audit as a Social Accountability Mechanism for Strengthening Governance and Service Delivery in the Primary Health Care Setting of Nepal: A Qualitative Study” Critical Pub. Health 30, no. 5 (23 Sep. 2019): 612–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/09581596.2019.1667487.
[123] Yamini Aiyar and Soumya Kapoor Mehta, “Spectators or Participants? Effects of Social Audits in Andhra Pradesh” Econ. and Political Weekly 50, no. 7 (14 Feb. 2015): 66–71, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24481397.
[124] Yamini Aiyar, Soumya Kapoor Mehta, and Salimah Samji, “Strengthening Public Accountability: Lessons from Implementing Social Audits in Andhra Pradesh” Engaging Accountability Working Paper Series 38 (Accountability Initiative, 2012), https://accountabilityindia.in/publication/strengthening-public-accountability-andhra-pradesh/.
[125] Sara Gullo, Christine Galavotti, and Lara Altman, “A Review of CARE’s Community Score Card Experience and Evidence” Health Policy and Planning 31, no. 10 (2016): 1467–78, https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czw064.
[126] Sandeep Tambe, et al., “Measuring the Effectiveness of Social Audits: Experiences from Sikkim, India.” Development in Practice 26 no. 2, (10 Feb. 2016): 184–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2016.1136268.
[127] James Long and Pranab Panday, Evaluation Results of “Citizen Voice & Action” Nobo Jatra Program (World Vision, 2020), https://wvusstatic.com/2020/landing-pages/hunger-food-security/Evaluation_Results_of_CVA_Nobo_Jatra_WV_Bangladesh.pdf.
[128] This chapter is based on a background paper by Suchi Pande and Naomi Hossain to support The Skeptic’s Guide: Suchi Pande and Naomi Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms in the public sector: a literature review (Open Government Partnership and Accountability Research Center, May 2022), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/grievance-redress-mechanisms-in-the-public-sector-a-literature-review/.
[129] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms.
[130] Helene Grandvoinnet, Ghazia Aslam, and Shomikho Raha, Opening the Black Box: The Contextual Drivers of Social Accountability (World Bank Publications, 29 Apr. 2015),https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-1-4648-0481-6.
[131] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms.
[132] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms.
[133] Suchi Pande, “Dying for Information: Right to Information and Whistleblower Protection in India” U4 Brief 3 (Mar. 2015), https://www.u4.no/publications/dying-for-information-right-to-information-and-whistleblower-protection-in-india.pdf.
[134] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms.
[135] As of 2018, the World Bank requires all investment project financing to “propose and implement GRMs under the Environmental and Social Standard 10: Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure” (See: World Bank, Insights into Grievance Mechanisms: Findings from a Survey of Grievance Focal Points in Project Implementation Units (World Bank, 2021).
[136] Helene Pfeil and Sanjay Agarwal, Gaining Traction or Spinning Wheels? Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Grievance Redress Mechanisms in World Bank-Financed Projects, (World Bank, 2021).
[137] Pfeil and Agarwal, Gaining Traction or Spinning Wheels?
[138] This review draws evidence from GRMs in developing countries only. Future research can look at the adoption and use of GRMs and related approaches in higher income countries.
[139] Joy Aceron, Anna Bueno, and Victoria Maglanque, Have Loans Helped the Citizen Engagement and Accountability Mechanisms in Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) to Continue amid the COVID-19 Pandemic? (Government Watch, 2021), https://www.g-watch.org/resources/vertical-integration-research/have-loans-helped-citizen-engagement-and-accountability.
[140] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms citing Haris Gazdar and Samar Zuberi, Final Report of the Beneficiary Feedback Survey, National Cash Transfer Programme–Pakistan (Collective for Social Science Research, 2014), http://www.researchcollective.org/Documents/Updated_Anonymised_BFS_Final_Report_03022014.pdf.
[141] Wahyu Mahendra, Metia Pratiwi, and Ririn Prawesti, Citizens’ Aspirations and Complaints Online System (LAPOR) in Indonesia: Making Citizens Happy (ResearchGate, Jun. 2014), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320074100_Citizens’_Aspirations_and_Complaints_Online_System_LAPOR_in_Indonesia_Making_Citizens_Happy.
[142] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms citing Aaditeshwar Seth, Aarushi Gupta, and Mira Johri, Delivery of Social Protection Entitlements in India: Unpacking Exclusion, Grievance Redress, and the Relevance of Citizen-Assistance Mechanisms (Gram Vaani & Dvara Research, 2021), https://socialprotection.org/discover/publications/delivery-social-protection-entitlements-india-unpacking-exclusion-grievance and Francesca Feruglio and Abrahams Misoi, Trust, Responsiveness and Sustainability in Complaints Systems: Transparency International’s Experience with Uwajibikaji Pamoja (Making All Voices Count and Institute of Development Studies, 3 Nov. 2017), https://www.makingallvoicescount.org/publication/trust-responsiveness-sustainability-complaints-systems-transparency-internationals-experience-uwajibikaji-pamoja/.
[143] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms citing Pfeil and Agarwal, “Gaining Traction or Spinning Wheels?”
[144] Martin Belcher and Claudia Abreu Lopes, “MajiVoice Kenya—Better Complaint Management at Public Utilities” in Civic Tech in the Global South: Assessing Technology for the Public Good, ed. Tiago Peixoto and Micah L. Sifry (World Bank and Personal Democracy Press, 2017), 179, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312585033_Maji_Voice_Kenya_Better_complaint_management_at_public_utilities.
[145] Jonathan Caseley, “Multiple Accountability Relationships and Improved Service Delivery Performance in Hyderabad City, Southern India.” Int’l Rev. of Adm. Sci. 72, no. 4 (1 Dec. 2006): 535, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852306070082.
[146] Caseley, “Multiple Accountability Relationships.”
[147] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms.
[148] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms citing Valentina Barca, Grievance Mechanisms for Social Protection Programmes: Stumbling Blocks and Best Practice (International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 2016) https://ideas.repec.org/p/ipc/opager/320.html.
[151] Tamsin Ayliffe, Ghazia Aslam, and Rasmus Schjødt, Social Accountability in the Delivery of Social Protection working paper (Development Pathways Limited, Sep. 2017), https://socialprotection-humanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Social-Accountability-Literature-Review.pdf.
[152] Haris Gazdar and Samar Zuberi, Final Report of the Beneficiary Feedback Survey, National Cash Transfer Programme–Pakistan (2014), Vicenzo Vinci and Keetie Roelen, Institutional Factors and People’s Preferences in the Implementation of Social Protection: The Case of Ethiopia (2018), and Valentina Barca, Grievance Mechanisms for Social Protection Programmes: Stumbling Blocks and Best Practice (International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 2016) https://ideas.repec.org/p/ipc/opager/320.html.
[153] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms citing Seth, Gupta, and Johri, Delivery of Social Protection Entitlements in India.
[154] Pande and Hossain, Grievance redress mechanisms
[155] Ibid.
[1] “What Is Civic Space?” Monitor, CIVICUS, accessed July 2022, https://monitor.civicus.org/whatiscivicspace/.
[2] This chapter is based on a literature review conducted by Peter Noorlander to support TheSkeptic’sGuide with guidance from the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights and Rule of Law Initiative: Peter Noorlander, The Impact of Protecting Civic Space: Review of the State of the Evidence (Open Government Partnership and American Bar Association, 2022), [Add link here].
[3] The term freedomofexpression is often used interchangeably with the terms freespeech, freedomofspeech, and similar terms. This chapter will stick to the term freedomofexpression as used in international human rights law. This is an umbrella term that includes notions such as “press freedom” and “media freedom.” The right of access to information held by or on behalf of public bodies, often also referred to as “freedom of information” or the “right to information” and which is considered part of the right to freedom of expression, is the subject of a separate review and is therefore excluded from the scope of this chapter.
[4] “Media Freedom,” Freedom House, accessed July 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/issues/media-freedom.
[5] The literature review that informed this chapter focused on English-language publications, which might represent a de facto geographical limitation.
[6] A. L. Hogg and R. Hodess, “The Business Case for Protecting Civic Rights” (The B Team, 2018), https://bteam.org/our-thinking/reports/the-business-case-for-protecting-civic-rights.
[7] N. Hossain, N. Khurana, S. Nazneen, M. Oosterom, P. Schröder, and A. Shankland, “Development Needs Civil Society—The Implications of Civic Space for the Sustainable Development Goals” (Institute for Development Studies, 2019), 54.
[8] Hossain et al., “Development Needs Civil Society” (2019).
[9] N. Hossain and M. Oosterom, “The Implications of Closing Civic Space for Hunger and Poverty in the Global South,” GlobalPolicy 12 no. S5 (2021): 59–69.
[10] “Reinforcing Marginalization: The Impact of the Closing Civic Space on HIV Response in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda,” ICNL (2019), accessed July 2022, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/ICNL-Reinforcing-Marginalization.pdf.
[11] “How the Open Society Foundations Are Defending Free Speech in Hungary,” Open Society Foundations (September 2018), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/how-open-society-foundations-are-defending-free-speech-hungary.
[12] T. Roberts (ed.), Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries (Brighton: Institute for Development Studies, 2021).
[13] S. Nazneen and D. Thapa, “The Implications of Closing Civic Space for Sustainable Development in Nepal” (Institute for Development Studies, 2019), 2.
[14] Noorlander citing M. R. Platas and P. J. Raffler, “Closing the Gap: Information and Mass Support in a Dominant Party Regime,” Journal of Politics 83, no. 4 (2021).
[15] A. Scavo and C. Snow, Media and Political Participation: Fostering Inclusive Governance (BBC Media Action 2016).
[16] S. Corke, A. Finkel, D. J. Kramer, C. A. Robbins, and N. Schenkkan, Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2014); M. Akser and B. Baybars-Hawks, “Media and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Model of Neoliberal Media Autocracy,” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 5 no. 3 (2012).
[17] Noorlander citing V. Stojarová, “Media in the Western Balkans: Who Controls the Past Controls the Future,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20 no. 1 (2019).
[18] A. Scavo and C. Snow, Media and Political Participation: Fostering Inclusive Governance (BBC Media Action, 2016).
[19] A. Scavo, and C. Snow, Media and Political Participation: Fostering Inclusive Governance (BBC Media Action, 2016).
[20] T. Susman-Peña, Healthy Media, Vibrant Societies: How Strengthening the Media Can Boost Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Internews, 2012); C. J. Coyne and P. T. Leeson, Media, Development, and Institutional Change (Edward Elgar, 2009).
[21] T. Susman-Peña, Healthy Media, Vibrant Societies: How Strengthening the Media Can Boost Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Internews, 2012); C. J. Coyne and P. T.Leeson, Media, Development, and Institutional Change (Edward Elgar, 2009).
[22] UNESCO, Journalism Is a Public Good: World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development, Global Report 2021/2022, (2022), 20.
[23] Sembra, “Inflection Point International: A Study of the Impact, Innovation, Threats, and Sustainability of Digital Media Entrepreneurs in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa” (The Communication Initiative Network, 2022), https://www.comminit.com/media-development/content/inflection-point-international-study-impact-innovation-threats-and-sustainability-digita.
[24] Noorlander citing N. Binhadab, M. Breen, and R. Gillanders, “Press Freedom and Corruption in Business-State Interactions,” EconomicSystems 45 no. 4 (2021); N. Binhadab, M. Breen, and R. Gillanders, “The Role of a Free Press in Combating Business Corruption” (Munich University, 2018). See also A. Talebia, F. Momenib, and E. Shojaei, “Media Freedom and Corruption in Different Countries of the World,” Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education 12 no. 13 (2021); O. Bondarenko, M. Utkina, and M. V. Kolenisnikova, “The Role of Mass Media in Preventing Corruption,” The Law, State and Telecommunications Review 13 no. 1 (2021); B. I. Hamada, G. Abdel-Salam, and E. Abdelwahed Elkilany, “Press Freedom and Corruption: An Examination of the Relationship,” Global Media and Communication 15 no. 3 (2019).
[25] Noorlander citing M. Hrvolova, J. D. Katz, and J. Alexander, “The Anti-Corruption Role of Free Media and Investigative Journalism” (The German Marshall Fund, 2021). See also the ongoing impact of the Panama Papers as reported by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists: Will Fitzgibbon and Michael Hudson, “Five Years Later, Panama Papers Still Having a Big Impact,” ICIJ, April 3, 2021, https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/five-years-later-panama-papers-still-having-a-big-impact/.
[26] Noorlander citing “Impact to Date,” Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (June 6, 2022), https://www.occrp.org/en/impact-to-date. OCCRP is a nonprofit consortium of media outlets that report on organized crime and corruption.
[27] Noorlander citing Media Development Investment Fund Impact 2021: Corruption, Media Development Investment Fund, https://static.mdif.org/2021-impact-dashboard/index.html#/slide-corruption1.
[28] M. Breen and R. Gillanders, “Press Freedom and Corruption Perceptions: Is There a Reputational Premium?” Politics and Governance 8, no. 2 (2020).
[29] A. Mungiu-Pippidi, Quantitative Report on Causes of Performance and Stagnation in the Global Fight against Corruption (Hertie School of Governance, 2014).
[30] Noorlander citing A. Mungiu-Pippidi, Quantitative Report on Causes of Performance and Stagnation in the Global Fight against Corruption (Hertie School of Governance, 2014).
[31] Noorlander citing P. A. G. Villanueva, “Why Civil Society Cannot Battle It All Alone: The Roles of Civil Society Environment, Transparent Laws and Quality of Public Administration in Political Corruption Mitigation,” International Journal of Public Administration 43 no. 6 (2020), 558.
[32] Noorlander citing P. Tjiptoherijanto, “Trust in Government: The Indonesian Experience,” InternationalPublicManagementReview 11, no. 2 (2010).
[33] P. Tjiptoherijanto, “Trust in Government: The Indonesian Experience,” InternationalPublicManagementReview 11, no. 2 (2010).
[34] J. Spiteri and M. Briguglio, “Does Good Governance Foster Trust in Government? An Empirical Analysis,” in S. Grima and P. Marano (eds.), Governance and Regulations’ Contemporary Issues (Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Vol. 99), (Emerald Publishing Limited, 2018), 121–137.
[35] M. Shin, “Confidence in Public Institutions and Democracy in South Korea,” KoreaObserver 37, no. 2 (2006).
[36] P. Norris, “Trust in Government Redux: The Role of Information Environments and Cognitive Skills” (Harvard Kennedy School, 2022), 15.
[37] P. Norris, “Trust in Government Redux: The Role of Information Environments and Cognitive Skills” (Harvard Kennedy School, 2022), 15.
[38] Peter Noorlander, The Impact of Protecting Civic Space: Review of the State of the Evidence (Open Government Partnership and American Bar Association, 2022), [Add link here].
[39] OECD, Together for Better Public Services: Partnering with Citizens and Civil Society, OECD Public Governance Reviews (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264118843-en.
[40] OECD, Together for Better Public Services: Partnering with Citizens and Civil Society, OECD Public Governance Reviews (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264118843-en.
[41] OECD, Together for Better Public Services: Partnering with Citizens and Civil Society, OECD Public Governance Reviews (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264118843-en.
[42] H. Waddington, A. Sonnenfeld, J. Finetti, M. Gaarder, J. Denny, and J. Stevenson, “Citizen Engagement in Public Services in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Mixed-Methods Systematic Review of Participation, Inclusion, Transparency and Accountability (PITA) Initiatives,” CampbellSystematicReviews 15, no. 1–2 (2019), 1.
[43] H. Waddington, A. Sonnenfeld, J. Finetti, M. Gaarder, J. Denny, and J. Stevenson, “Citizen Engagement in Public Services in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Mixed-Methods Systematic Review of Participation, Inclusion, Transparency and Accountability (PITA) Initiatives,” CampbellSystematicReviews 15, no. 1–2 (2019), 1.
[44] N. Hossain and R. Santos, “Assessing the Impacts of Changing Civic Space on Development Outcomes: A Methodological Discussion” (Institute for Development Studies, 2018).
[45] P. Schröder and S. Young, “The Implications of Closing Civic Space for Sustainable Development in Cambodia” (Institute for Development Studies, 2019), 27. See also M. Oosterom, “The Implications of Closing Civic Space for Sustainable Development in Zimbabwe” (Institute for Development Studies, 2019); S. Nazneen and D. Thapa, “The Implications of Closing Civic Space for Sustainable Development in Nepal” (Institute for Development Studies, 2019).
[46] “Reinforcing Marginalization: The Impact of the Closing of Civic Space on HIV Response in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda,” ICNL (2019), accessed July 2022, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/ICNL-Reinforcing-Marginalization.pdf.
[47] “The Cost of South Africa’s Misguided AIDS Policies,” Harvard T. Chan School of Public Health (Spring 2009), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/magazine/spr09aids/.
[48] The Treatment and Action Campaign (TAC)engages in monitoring, advocacy, and campaigning within the healthcare system to ensure that all public healthcare users can access quality and dignified healthcare, https://www.tac.org.za/.
[49] “The Cost of South Africa’s Misguided AIDS Policies,” Harvard T. Chan School of Public Health (Spring 2009), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/magazine/spr09aids/.
[50] Noorlander citing N. Annan, M. Beseng, G. Crawford, and J. K. Kewir, “Civil Society, Peacebuilding from Below and Shrinking Civic Space: The Case of Cameroon’s ‘Anglophone’ Conflict,” Conflict, Security & Development 21 no. 6 (2021): 697–725.
[51] G. Holmer, Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective (US Institute of Peace, 2013).
[52] C. N. Voulé, “Exercise of the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association and the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda” (United Nations, 2018), 21; M. Kiai, Achievements of Civil Society (Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association) (United Nations, 2017).
[53] Noorlander citing T. I. Emerson, “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,” Yale Law Journal 72 (1962): 884.
[54] Noorlander citing J. W. Koo and A. Murdie, “Do NGO Restrictions Limit Terrorism? Smear Campaigns or Counterterrorism Tools,” Journal of Global Security Studies 7 no. 1 (2022).
[55] L. Skjoldager Eskildsen and P. Bjørnskov, “Does Freedom of Expression Cause Less Terrorism?,” PoliticalStudies 70 no. 1 (2020), 18.
[56] L. Skjoldager Eskildsen and P. Bjørnskov, “Does Freedom of Expression Cause Less Terrorism?,” PoliticalStudies 70 no. 1 (2020), 18.
[57] F. S. Bethke and J. Pinckney, “Non-Violent Resistance and the Quality of Democracy,” ConflictManagementandPeaceScience 38 no. 5 (2021): 503–523.
[58] Noorlander citing N. Hossain, N. Khurana, S. Mohmand, S. Nazneen, M. Oosterom, T. Roberts, R. Santos, A. Shankland, and P. Schröder, “What Does Closing Civic Space Mean for Development? A Literature Review and Proposed Conceptual Framework” (Institute for Development Studies, 2018); S. Hickey, K. Sen, and B. Bukenya, “Exploring the Politics of Inclusive Development: Towards a New Conceptual Approach,” chapter in S. Hickey, K. Sen, and B. Bukenya (eds), The Politics of Inclusive Development: Interrogating the Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); M. Khan, “Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions” (SOAS, 2010); G. White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical Ground,” Democratization 1 no. 2 (1994).
[59] N. Hossain and R. Santos, “Assessing the Impacts of Changing Civic Space on Development Outcomes: A Methodological Discussion” (Institute for Development Studies, 2018).
[60] N. Hossain and M. Oosterom, “The Implications of Closing Civic Space for Hunger and Poverty in the Global South,” GlobalPolicy 12 no. S5 (2021): 59–69.
[61] Peter Noorlander, The Impact of Protecting Civic Space: Review of the State of the Evidence (Open Government Partnership and American Bar Association, 2022), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/the-impact-of-protecting-civic-space-review-of-the-state-of-the-evidence/.
[62] Peter Noorlander, The Impact of Protecting Civic Space: Review of the State of the Evidence (Open Government Partnership and American Bar Association, 2022), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/the-impact-of-protecting-civic-space-review-of-the-state-of-the-evidence/.
[63] Noorlander citing A. Ansoms, E. Marijnen, G. Cioffo, and J. Murison, “Statistics versus Livelihoods: Questioning Rwanda’s Pathway out of Poverty,” Review of African Political Economy 44 Issue 151 (2017): 47–65.
[64] The literature review underlying this chapter focused on English-language literature only. Further review of literature in other languages, such as Spanish and French, to name only two, would strengthen the case for civic space and democratic freedoms.
[65] Peter Noorlander, The Impact of Protecting Civic Space: Review of the State of the Evidence (Open Government Partnership and American Bar Association, 2022), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/the-impact-of-protecting-civic-space-review-of-the-state-of-the-evidence/.
[1] This chapter is based on a background paper developed by Jessica Hickle to support The Skeptic’s Guide: Jessica Hickle, State of the Evidence: Debt Transparency. (Open Government Partnership, 2023).
[2] All definitions refer to sovereign debt.
[3] Diego Rivetti, “Debt Transparency in Developing Economies” (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2021), https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/743881635526394087/pdf/Debt-Transparency-in-Developing-Economies.pdf
[4] Hickle, State of the Evidence: Debt Transparency.
[5] “Back to Basics: What Is Debt Sustainability? – IMF F&D,” IMF, accessed January 6, 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/09/what-is-debt-sustainability-basics.
[6] “Back to Basics”
[7] “Back to Basics”
[8] Hickle, State of the Evidence: Debt Transparency.
[9] “What is sovereign debt?” Santander (June 10, 2022), https://www.santander.com/en/stories/sovereign-debt.
[10] Hickle, State of the Evidence: Debt Transparency.
[11] Can Chen and Milena I. Neshkova, “The Effect of Fiscal Transparency on Corruption: A Panel Cross-Country Analysis,” Public Administration 98, no. 1 (2020): 226–43, https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12620.
[12] The Open Budget Index (OBI) evaluates the public availability of key budget documents in a country, as follows: Pre-Budget Statement, Executive’s Budget Proposal (EBP) and Supporting EBP Documents, Citizens Budget, Enacted Budget, InYear Reports, Mid-Year Review, Year-End Report, and Audit Report. The OBI includes indicators for whether countries publish information about debt such as the expected and actual interest rates on debt instruments, debt maturity, and whether the debt is domestic or external.
[13] Hickle citing Chen and Neshkova, “The Effect of Fiscal Transparency on Corruption.”
[14] Gabriel Caldas Montes and Paulo Henrique Luna, “Fiscal Transparency, Legal System and Perception of the Control on Corruption: Empirical Evidence from Panel Data,” Empirical Economics 60, no. 4 (April 2021): 2005–37, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-020-01849-9
[15] Montes and Luna, “Fiscal Transparency, Legal System and Perception of the Control on Corruption.”
[16] Gabriel Caldas Montes, Júlio Cesar Albuquerque Bastos, and Ana Jordânia de Oliveira, “Fiscal Transparency, Government Effectiveness and Government Spending Efficiency: Some International Evidence Based on Panel Data Approach,” Economic Modelling 79 (June 1, 2019): 211–25, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2018.10.013
[17] Montes, Bastos, and de Oliveira, “Fiscal Transparency, Government Effectiveness and Government Spending Efficiency.”
[18] Elina De Simone et al., “The Effect of Fiscal Transparency on Government Spending Efficiency,” Journal of Economic Studies 46, no. 7 (2019): 1365–79, https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-03-2019-0123.
[19] Hickle citing De Simone et al., “The Effect of Fiscal Transparency on Government Spending Efficiency.”
[20] Hickle citing Luís de Sousa, Pedro C. Magalhães, and Luciano Amaral, “Sovereign Debt and Governance Failures: Portuguese Democracy and the Financial Crisis,” American Behavioral Scientist 58, no. 12 (November 1, 2014): 1517–41, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764214534666.
[21] Hickle citing de Sousa, Magalhães, and Amaral, “Sovereign Debt and Governance Failures.”
[22] Elif Arbatli and Julio Escolano, “Fiscal Transparency, Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings,” Fiscal Studies 36, no. 2 (2015): 237–70.
[23] Hickle citing Arbatli and Escolano.
[24] Hickle citing Jinhai Yu, Wenchi Wei, and J. S. Butler, “Fiscal Transparency and Government Credit Quality: Evidence from the U.S. States,” Public Performance & Management Review 44, no. 2 (March 4, 2021): 378–403, https://doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1807368.
[25] Hickle citing Ben Cormier, “Democracy, Public Debt Transparency, and Sovereign Creditworthiness,” Governance (December 14, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12668.
[26] Cormier, “Democracy, Public Debt Transparency, and Sovereign Creditworthiness.”
[27] Francisco Bastida, María-Dolores Guillamón, and Bernardino Benito, “Fiscal Transparency and the Cost of Sovereign Debt,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 83, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 106–28, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852315574999.
[28] Bernardino Benito, María-Dolores Guillamón, and Francisco Bastida, “The Impact of Transparency on the Cost of Sovereign Debt in Times of Economic Crisis,” Financial Accountability & Management 32, no. 3 (2016): 309–34, https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12090.
[29] Hickle, State of the Evidence: Debt Transparency.
[30] These initiatives are the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS). For more information, seeYuko Hashimoto and Sangyup Choi, “The Effects of Data Transparency Policy Reforms on Emerging Market Sovereign Bond Spreads,” IMF, 2017, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/03/28/The-Effects-of-Data-Transparency-Policy-Reforms-on-Emerging-Market-Sovereign-Bond-Spreads-44772.
[32] S.M. Ali Abbas and Alex Pienkowski, “What is sovereign debt?” IMF (December 2022), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/12/basics-what-is-sovereign-debt.
[33] George Kopits and J. Craig, Transparency in Government Operations, Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1998), https://doi.org/10.5089/9781557756978.084.
[34] Hickle, State of the Evidence: Debt Transparency.
[35] James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen, “Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt in OECD Countries,” European Economic Review 50, no. 6 (August 1, 2006): 1403–39, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001.
[36] Aart Kraay and Vikram Nehru, “When Is External Debt Sustainable?,” The World Bank Economic Review 20, no. 3 (2006): 341–65.
[37] Hickle, State of the Evidence: Debt Transparency
[38] Martin Melecky, Hidden Debt: Solutions to Avert the Next Financial Crisis in South Asia (The World Bank, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1667-3.
[39] Cameron Ballard-Rosa et al., “Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions and Global Capital Cycles,” British Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (January 2021): 353–73, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000455.
[40] Hickle citing Miguel Fuentes and Diego Saravia, “Sovereign Defaulters: Do International Capital Markets Punish Them?,” Journal of Development Economics 91, no. 2 (March 1, 2010): 336–47, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.06.005.
[41] Helder Ferreira de Mendonça and Vítor Ribeiro Laufer Calafate, “Lack of Fiscal Transparency and Economic Growth Expectations: An Empirical Assessment from a Large Emerging Economy,” Empirical Economics 61, no. 6 (December 2021): 2985–3027, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-020-02000-4.
[42] Hickle, State of the Evidence: Debt Transparency.
[1] This chapter is based on a background paper developed by Matías Valderrama, María Paz Hermosilla and Romina Garrido to support The Skeptic’s Guide: Matías Valderrama, María Paz Hermosilla and Romina Garrido, State of the Evidence: Algorithmic Transparency (Open Government Partnership and Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, 2023).
[2] “Artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms: a complete overview,” Tableau (n.d.), https://www.tableau.com/data-insights/ai/algorithms#definition.
[3] S. Shubhendu and J. Vijay, “Applicability of Artificial Intelligence in Different Fields of Life,” Computer Science (2013), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Applicability-of-Artificial-Intelligence-in-Fields-Shubhendu-Vijay/2480a71ef5e5a2b1f4a9217a0432c0c974c6c28c?p2df.
[4] “Artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms,” Tableau.
[5] Valderrama et al., 2023.
[6] Scholars have not agreed upon a definition of algorithmic transparency. For some scholars, accountability is considered a dimension of algorithmic transparency, while in other cases, algorithmic transparency is considered a mechanism to achieve algorithmic accountability. For the purposes of this chapter, algorithmic transparency will be limited to the aforementioned definition.
[7] Helen Darbishire, Proactive Transparency: The future of the right to information? World Bank Institute Working Paper Series (September 2010), (https://www.access-info.org/wp-content/uploads/Darbishire_Proactive_Transparency.pdf.
[8] Darbishire, 2010.
[9] A. Jobin, M. Ienca, and E. Vayena, “The global landscape of AI ethics guidelines,” Nature Machine Intelligence, 1 no. 9 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-019-0088-2; J. Fjeld, N. Achten, H. Hilligoss, A. Nagy, and M. Srikumar, Principled Artificial Intelligence: Mapping Consensus in Ethical and Rights-based Approaches to Principles for AI, Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society (2020), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42160420.
[10] K. Fink, “Opening the government’s black boxes: Freedom of information and algorithmic accountability,” Information, Communication & Society, 21 no. 10 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1330418.
[11] “What is FOIA?” FOIA.gov, Office of Information Policy (n.d.) https://www.foia.gov/faq.html#:~:text=Exemption%201%3A%20Information%20that%20is,disclosure%20by%20another%20federal%20law.
[12] Ada Lovelace Institute, AI Now Institute, and Open Government Partnership, Algorithmic accountability for the public sector (2021), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/algorithmic-accountability-public-sector.
[13] ISO is preparing a taxonomy of information that should be disclosed to help stakeholders identify and address the transparency needs of AI systems. For more information, see ISO, “ISO/IEC AWI 12792: Information technology — Artificial intelligence — Transparency taxonomy of AI systems,” (n.d.) https://www.iso.org/standard/84111.html.
[14] Ada Lovelace Institute and DataKind UK, Examining the Black Box: Tools for assessing algorithmic systems (2020), https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/examining-the-black-box-tools-for-assessing-algorithmic-systems/.
[15] Ada Lovelace Institute and DataKind UK, 2020.
[16] S. Brown, J. Davidovic, and A. Hasan, “The algorithm audit: Scoring the algorithms that score us,” Big Data & Society, 8 no. 1 (2021), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053951720983865.
[17] Researchers have developed a relevancy matrix suggesting which performance metrics could be made transparent through audits. For more information, please refer to Valderrama et al., State of the Evidence: Algorithmic Transparency.
[18] J. Buolamwini and T. Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research: Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf.
[19] S. Grimmelikhuijsen, “Explaining Why the Computer Says No: Algorithmic Transparency Affects the Perceived Trustworthiness of Automated Decision‐Making,” Public Administration Review (2022), https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13483.
[20] BritainThinks, Complete transparency, complete simplicity: How can the public sector be meaningfully transparent about algorithmic decision making? Gov.UK (June 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cdei-publishes-commissioned-research-on-algorithmic-transparency-in-the-public-sector/britainthinks-complete-transparency-complete-simplicity.
[21] D. S. Schiff, K. J. Schiff, and P. Pierson, “Assessing public value failure in government adoption of artificial intelligence,” Public Administration, 100 no. 3 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12742.
[22] J. I. Criado, J. Valero, and J. Villodre, “Algorithmic transparency and bureaucratic discretion: The case of SALER early warning system,” Information Polity, 25 no. 4 (2020), https://doi.org/10.3233/IP-200260.
[2] Clement Minaudier. 2022. “The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 38 (2): 570–612. 10.1093/jleo/ewab020.
[3] Minaudier, 2022.
[4] Maya Kornberg and Sven T. Siefken. 2023. “Committee Hearings as Parliamentary Public Engagement: A Global Perspective.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 29 (3): 442-462. https://doi-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/10.1080/13572334.2023.2249745.
[5] Kornberg and Siefken, 2023.
[6] Justin Kirkland and Jeffrey Harden, 2022. The Illusion of Accountability: Transparency and Representation in American Legislatures. Cambridge University Press.
[7] Sarah E. Anderson. 2020. Rejecting Compromise: Legislators’ Fear of Primary Voters, 1st ed. New York: Cambridge University Press; James P. Cross. 2013. “Striking a Pose: Transparency and Position Taking in the Council of the European Union.” European Journal of Political Research 52 (3): 291–315. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12000.
[8] Kirkland and Harden, 2022.
[9] Kirkland and Harden, 2022.
[10] Kirkland and Harden, 2022.
[11] Caitlin Ainsley, Clifford J. Carrubba, Brian F. Crisp, Betul Demirkaya, Matthew J. Gabel, and Dino Hadzic. 2020. “Roll-Call Vote Selection: Implications for the Study of Legislative Politics.” American Political Science Review 114 (3): 691–706. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000192.
[12] Ainsley et al., 2020.
[13] Christine Benesch, Monika Bütler, and Katharina E. Hofer. 2018. “Transparency in Parliamentary Voting.” Journal of Public Economics 163: 60–76. https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/science/article/pii/S0047272718300604?via%3Dihub.
[14] Hélöise Cloléry. 2021. “Legislators in the Crossfire: The Effect of Transparency on Parliamentary Voting.” IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc. https://ideas.repec.org/p/crs/wpaper/2021-12.html.
[15] Cloréry, 2021.
[16] Ben Worthy, Stefani Langehennig, and Cat Morgan. 2022. “Who is Watching Parliament? Monitory Democracy at Westminster.” Birkbeck College, University of London. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4141814.
[17] Antonio Teixeira de Barros, Cristiane Brum Bernardes, and Malena Rehbein. 2016. “Brazilian Parliament and Digital Engagement.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 22 (4): 540–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2016.1235331.
[18] T. Murat Yildrim. 2020. “Politics of Constituency Representation and Legislative Ambition under the Glare of Camera Light?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 45 (1): 101-130. https://doi-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/10.1111/lsq.12256.
[19] Maxime Boucher. 2021. Public Ethics and the Regulation of Corporate Political Activities in North America and Europe. Centre on Governance Working Paper Series, no. 01/21/EN, University of Ottawa.
[20] Michele Crepaz and Gizem Arikan. 2023. “The Effects of Transparency Regulation on Political Trust and Perceived Corruption: Evidence from a Survey Experiment.” Regulation & Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12555.
[21] Linnea Mills. 2017. “Parliamentary transparency and accountability.” K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/13200.
[22] Paul Bovend’Eert. 2020. “Public Office and Public Trust: Standards of Conduct in Parliament: A Comparative Analysis of Rules of Conduct in Three Parliaments.” Parliamentary Affairs 73 (2): 296–322. https://doi-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/10.1093/pa/gsy048.
[23] Miguel M. Pereira, Susana Coroado, Luís de Sousa, and Pedro C. Magalhães. 2023. “Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency.” Party Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688231203528.
[24] Vidačak and Senada Šelo Šabić, 2023.
[25] Odile Ammann. 2021. “Transparency at the Expense of Equality and Integrity: Present and Future Directions of Lobby Regulation in the European Parliament.” European Papers 6 (1): 239–268. https://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/e-journal/transparency-at-expense-of-equality-and-integrity.
[26] Adriana Bunea. 2018. “Legitimacy through Targeted Transparency? Regulatory Effectiveness and Sustainability of Lobbying Regulation in the European Union,” European Journal of Political Research 57: 378–403. https://doi-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/10.1111/1475-6765.12231.
[27] Ainsley et al., 2020.
[156] Valeriya Mechkova, Michael Bernhard, and Anna Lührmann, Diagonal Accountability and Development Outcomes (V-Dem Institute and Open Government Partnership, 1 Feb. 2019), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/diagonal-accountability-and-development-outcomes/#:~:text=This%20paper%20focuses%20on%20diagonal,are%20dependent%20on%20government%20action.
[157] Evidence of the effects of democracy on public health has been growing since Amartya Sen’s 1982 seminal work on the association between democracy and famine prevention. The underlying argument is that “[f]ree and fair elections create incentives for political leaders to pay serious attention to the wellbeing of voters.” (Richard Horton, “Offline: Is democracy good for your health?” The Lancet 398, no. 10316 (December 2021): 2060 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02747-1.) Recent research strengthens this argument and finds that democratic governments have better life expectancy (Álvaro Franco, Carlos Alvarez-Dardet, and Maria Teresa Ruiz, “Effect of democracy on health: ecological study” BMJ 329 (2004), 1421–1423, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.329.7480.1421; Thomas J. Bollyky, et al., “The relationships between democratic experience, adult health, and cause-specific mortality in 170 countries between 1980 and 2016: an observational analysis” The Lancet 393, no. 10181 (13 Mar. 2019): 1628–1640, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(19)30235-1/fulltext), lower infant mortality (Franco, Alvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz, “Effect of democracy on health;” Yi-ting Wang, Valeriya Mechkova and Frida Andersson, “Does Democracy Enhance Health? New Empirical Evidence 1900–2012,” Political Research Quarterly 72, no. 3 (September 2018): 554-569, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1065912918798506; Masayuki Kudamatsu, “Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Micro Data,” Journal of the European Economic Association 10, no. 6, (December 2012): 1294–1317, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01092.x.), and lower maternal mortality (Franco, Alvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz, “Effect of democracy on health”).
[158] Bollyky, et al., “The relationships between democratic experience, adult health, and cause-specific mortality”
[159] Franco, Alvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz, “Effect of democracy on health.”
[160] Robin Niblett and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Why Democracies Do Better at Surviving Pandemics” (Chatham House, 26 May 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/why-democracies-do-better-surviving-pandemics.
[161] Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Does democracy lead to better health? (Our World in Data, 24 Jun. 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/democracy-health.
[162] A study by researchers Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Alvaro Lopez found the more a government publishes important data, the higher the number of reported deaths across 127 studied countries. This holds true even when accounting for the country’s health expenditure and the percentage of their population who is above 65 years old (more at risk of COVID-19 complications). “Counting the Dead Transparently” (Hertie School of Governance, 2022), https://www.againstcorruption.eu/articles/counting-the-dead-transparently/
[163] Ibid.
[164] See Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis, “Democratisation and Growth,” The Economic Journal 118, no. 532 (October 2008): 1520-1551, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20108873; Jakob Madsen, Paul Raschky and Ahmed Skali, “Does democracy drive income in the world, 1500–2000?” European Economic Review 78 (2015): 175–195. https://econpapers.repec.org/scripts/redir.pf?u=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1016%252Fj.euroecorev.2015.05.005;h=repec:eee:eecrev:v:78:y:2015:i:c:p:175-195; and Daron Acemoglu et al. “Democracy Does Cause Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 127 (February 2019): 47–100, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/700936?mobileUi=0&.)
[165] Vanessa A. Boese and Markus Eberhardt, Which Institutions Rule? Unbundling the Democracy-Growth Nexus Working Paper 131 (V-Dem Institute, Feb. 2022), https://www.v-dem.net/media/publications/Working_Paper_131.pdf.
[166] Raul Pacheco-Vega and Amanda Murdie “When do Environmental NGOs Work? A Test of the Conditional Effectiveness of Environmental Advocacy” Env. Pol. 30, no. 1–2 (28 Jun. 2020): 180–201, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09644016.2020.1785261?journalCode=fenp20.
[167] James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland, “Democracy and Transparency.” The J. of Pol. 73, no. 4 (Oct. 2011): 1191–1205, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1017/S0022381611000880.
[168] Christopher S. P. Magee and John A. Doces, “Reconsidering Regime Type and Growth: Lies, Dictatorships, and Statistics.” Int’l Studies Quarterly 59, no. 2 (Jun. 2015): 223–237, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/59/2/223/1788378.
[169] Joachim Wehner and Paolo de Renzio, “Citizens, Legislators, and Executive Disclosure: The Political Determinants of Fiscal Transparency” World Dev’t 41 (Jan. 2013): 96–108, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X12001647?via%3Dihub.
[170] OGP did not assess causality in this report. We determine statistical associations through multiple linear regression analysis. For more details, see Open Government Partnership, “OGP Vital Signs—10 Years of Data in Review” (2021), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/ogp-vital-signs-10-years-of-data-in-review/.
[171] Open Government Partnership, “OGP at 10: Toward Democratic Renewal” (accessed Apr. 2022), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/ogp-at-ten-toward-democratic-renewal/.
[172] Open Government Partnership, “OGP Vital Signs—10 Years of Data in Review.”
[173] Ibid.
[174] Open Government Partnership, “OGP at 10: Toward Democratic Renewal.”
[175] Open Government Partnership, “OGP Vital Signs—10 Years of Data in Review.”